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INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN CHINA

Roy Bahl

and
Sally Wallace

Policy Research Center and Economics Department
Georgia State University

Introduction

The development of the "best" fiscal arrangement among levels of government has rarely been as w
discussed and debated as it has been in the past five years (e.g., the devolution of the Soviet Union, t
federalism" in the U.S., decentralization in the Baltics, the breakup in the Balkans). Among other fact
enhanced technical abilities of local governments to provide services, and a worldwide trend toward

government have contributed to a belief in the increased potential of fiscal decentralization.
In many countries, the emphasis has been to increase the budgetary share of the local governments. T
been the case in the countries of the former Soviet Union. (Bahl and Wallich, 1994; Bahl and Wallace, 199

Martinez- Vazquez and Wallace, 1995) In China, however, the direction of reform has been different. Int
ernmental policies in China appear to be aimed at granting the central government a larger share of

revenue. In the midst of a significant change in its tax policy and tax administration (in 1994), Ch

significantly restructured the relationships among levels of government. This change and its potential im
the focus of this paper.

The Theory of Fiscal Decentralization

One way to examine the determinants of fiscal decentralization is to consider the a priori reasons why a
country might choose decentralization of its fiscal structure, that is, the theory of fiscal federalism (Oates, 19
These a priori arguments might be recast in a developing and transition country framework, and might be thou

of, as below, as the advantages and disadvantages of fiscal decentralization (Bahl and Linn, 1992).

Advantages of Decentralization

Economists invoke an efficiency criterion in arguing for fiscal decentralization. If preferences for publi
services differ across subgroups of the population, and if externalities are not present, then welfare is maximi
if local communities vote their preferences and provide the level and mix of public services that they want.
results of decentralization will be that the mix of services provided will match the demands of the local populat

government officials will become more accountable to voters for the quality of services they provide, and lo
populations will be more willing to pay for public services.
A second argument, not often made, is that fiscal decentralization can enhance revenue mobilization. Som
taxes are suited to local government because their assessment and collection requires familiarity with the loca
economy and population, and/or because they are perceived as quasi-benefit charges that finance local service
In this regard, the property tax and other land-based taxes are usually thought of as suitable local governmen
taxes. The individual income tax is a suitable candidate for local resource mobilization, as are taxes ön sma

firms that might not be reached by the national VAT.
In fact, the efficiency case for fiscal decentralization is much stronger in industrial than in developing
transition countries. This is because in developing countries local councils are not always elected, chief officia

are not always locally appointed, and adjustments in the allocation of local resources are often sever

constrained by central government controls (including central government budget approval, appointment
certain local officials and central tax administration). In this setting- where the devolution of revenue autho

and expenditure responsibility is not accompanied by a relaxation of central government control over local f

decisionmaking- there is less to be gained from fiscal decentralization than would be the case in indust
countries.
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Advantages of Centralization

The arguments for fiscal centralization, on the other hand, are stronger in transition and d
industrial countries. History has shown that stabilization policy is an especially important con
economies and in those economies that are in transition to a capitalist system, i This argues for
control of the main fiscal instruments (taxation, spending, and borrowing). Under a highly d
where the local governments have a built-in claim on a share of total revenues raised, the cent
find itself in a difficult position insofar as increasing revenues to reduce the total deficit, or pa
reforms that might be aimed at stimulating savings or reducing imports.
In transition countries that are undergoing privatization and building a public and industri

the need for a coherent investment policy is also an argument for fiscal centralization. As a corolla

allows the national government to allocate fiscal resources to goods and services with national
local autonomy would inevitably lead to greater expenditures on those services that have m
Several arguments for income distribution also support fiscal centralization. The most
regional (and rural-urban) disparities in income and wealth may be accentuated by fiscal decen
wealthier urban governments will benefit most from greater local taxing powers. Centra
national government more discretion in shaping regional differences in levels of public servi

China's System of Intergovernmental Relations: Pre- 1994

Until 1994, China's revenue sharing system was primarily a division of sales and profit taxes among the
central, provincial, and local governments. Taxes were collected by the local governments and "shared-up" to the
higher levels. The amount of shared tax revenue that finally shows up in the local government budget depends
on the centrally determined tax base and tax rates, the tax administration, and the sharing formulas. In addition,
there are earmarked grants given to provincial governments by the Center.

The Growth and Division of Revenues
Between 1983 and 1992, real expenditures of provincial and local governments increased by 35 percent,
but this was slower than the growth in GNP and slower than the growth in local government expenditures. In fact,
at the time of the income tax reform in 1983, the local government sector was spending an amount equivalent to
73 percent of what they collected and turning 27 percent over to the central government for national purposes.

By 1992, the local government sector was spending an amount equivalent to their total collections and was
receiving an additional subsidy from the Center equivalent to about 6 percent of expenditures. This change in the
division of revenues, and the consequent growth in extrabudgetary revenues, prompted a reform of the revenue
sharing system.

Fiscal Disparities
Revenue collections in China are roughly proportional to income level. The five highest income provinces
account for 1 8 percent of local government revenue collections and 1 9 percent of national income. However, these

provinces account for only 10 percent of the national population. This suggests that there are significant
disparities in per capita revenue collections among the provinces. In fact, the disparity in per capita revenue
collections among the provinces is from ¥ 1180 in Shanghai to ¥ 96 in Anhui and ¥ 8 in Tibet. This is quite a
substantial range.
Bahl and Wallich (1992) estimated an OLS regression of per capita budgetary collections against per capita
income, the rate of urbanization, and population size. The results show a strong significant relationship between

per capita revenue collections and per capita income. The income elasticities are high: In 1990, a 10 percent
difference in per capita income tended to be associated with a 16 percent difference in per capita revenue
collections.2 Population size did show the expected negative relationship with revenues, but was not significant
in either the 1987 or the 1990 equations.
Disparities are much less pronounced on the expenditure side, with a per capita variation of 6: 1 between the
highest and lowest provinces. The pattern of variation across provinces might be explained in the following way:
Higher income provinces spend more because of the greater demand for public services by their citizens and their

enterprises, their ability to raise more "local fixed" revenues, their ability to attract more grants, and very
importantly, their ability to slow the flow of revenues to the Center. More urbanized provinces spend more,
arguably because urbanization reflects a greater capacity to raise and retain taxes.
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China's System: After 1994

China's 1994 Tax Reform introduced significant changes to the overall revenue structure and

administration, as well as a new system of revenue sharing. The following presents a summary of the major
policy changes.3

Tax Policy
The enterprise income tax rate schedule was changed to a traditional, marginal rate schedule, with rates
from 18 to 33 percent. The tax base was broadened by elimination of local government exemptions, the loan
principal repayment deduction, and the system of local government "contracting"(negotiating tax liability on a
case-by-case basis). These base-broadening measures were somewhat offset by new accounting regulations that
increased certain deductions (for labor, bad debt and depreciation), and the adjustment of firms to the new
regulations. The net effect of the enterprise income tax changes was expected to be revenue neutral.
The value-added tax was also revised substantially in the 1994 Tax Reform. The new VAT rates are 17
percent for most goods, and 13 percent for newspapers, books, foodstuffs, and utilities. Exports are zero-rated,
but the central government pays the credit.^ The VAT base was broadened under the reform, reducing the number
of exempt items and bringing in other items that were taxed under the product tax (which is currently being phased
out). Administratively, the VAT system changed from a presumptive credit method to an invoice-credit method.

Tax Administration Change
Before 1994, tax administration was a central government function. However, the local offices of the STA
had divided loyalties, and there was some question about the efficiency with which local taxes were collected.
Moreover, the central office in Beijing has relatively tight control over the largely manual operations of the
Provincial offices.

The administrative system was changed dramatically in 1994 in two major ways. First, a separate local tax
bureau was established and given responsibility for income taxes and several smaller levies. This provides an
incentive for income tax revenue mobilization. Second, a credit-invoice method was adopted for VAT administration, a change that should increase revenues in the long run.

Accounting and Administrative Changes
A series of accounting and administrative reforms have also been undertaken since 1992. Among the most
important changes are the following: bad debts can no longer be written off directly against profits, inventory
valuation is carried out using LIFO, FIFO, or moving average methods, accelerated depreciation replaced straight
line depreciation, a cost accounting system that is more in line with international standards was adopted, and loan
repayment has been distinguished from interest payment.

These changes have had significant impacts. In general, they have put the system more in line with
international practice and have altered some of the incentives that firms face. In the short run, the disruption
caused by the changes may dampen revenue yield. In the long-run, the result should be higher revenue yields,
more efficiency in both tax administration and production, and a more stable source of revenue for both the central

and local governments.

Revenue Sharing Reform
There were two major changes in the Chinese system of revenue sharing in 1994. Perhaps most important
in the long run is that all revenues from the enterprise and individual income taxes are assigned to provincial
governments. All decisions about the tax rate and tax base, however, have been kept by the central government.
Arguably, this is the first step toward a true assignment system with some local rate setting autonomy.
The 1994 reform also changed the method by which the value added tax is shared. Under the new system,
there are four steps in determining the provincial government share.
1 . The central government gets 75 percent of "base" value added tax collections, and the local government
gets 25 percent on a derivation basis.
2. The Center then makes a transfer to the local government of an additional amount adequate to keep them
whole with respect to their 1993 expenditures.
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3. The amount transferred to the central government (or from the central government in the case of d

provinces) must be held constant.
4. The yearly increment in the VAT is divided 25 percent to the provincial government and 75 percent
Center. Of the 75 percent central share of the increment, 30 percent is given to the locals.

To better illustrate the working of the new system, and to suggest the kinds of special arrangements that e

an example for Yunnan Province might be useful. Under a special arrangement in Yunnan provin

subnational governments share the VAT with the Center according to a 75 percent central, 25 percent loc
Revenues from the consumption tax (base year equivalent) are given fully to the local government (increm
increases are treated differently, as described below). The calculation of the "base amounts" for shari
complicated matter. The "base" amounts for Yunnan, for example, are the totals that would have been coll
in 1993 had the 1994 tax laws been in place. It is a hypothetical amount.
There are three types of grants in the system. Earmarked Grants are primarily for construction projec
for subsidies for heating coal and food (grain subsidies). The distribution of this amount among provinces
formula in the case of subsidies, and by project selection (ad hoc) in the case of construction projects. The
no change in this component in 1994. Deficit or system grants to the poor provinces existed under the pr
system and continue to exist. Under the old system, these provinces kept all they collected and received a

sum grant to cover their remaining expenditures. Now they share the VAT, etc., just as any other province, but

are kept whole at their 1993 level with a continuation of the deficit grant and a "revenue return" grant. Re
return grants are received by all provinces. They are equal to the amount of VAT and consumption tax re
to be returned to the local governments to hold them harmless at 1993 levels of expenditure net of trans
the central government.

Intra- Provine e Sharing

The Chinese system takes on a characteristic of federalism by allowing the provincial governments to
all decisions about intra-province sharing. There are few restrictions, and provincial governments do mak
different decisions about how they share taxes and about the distribution of grants among their subordina
governments.
The 1994 reform did not change the division of powers in this regard; higher level governments still r
control over lower level units. However, the 1994 reform does have profound effects on this sharing. The
rules that assign the enterprise income tax and its administration entirely to subnational governments mea
provincial governments must rethink distribution policy. The revenues from the enterprise income tax a
skill of administration will be heavily concentrated in the wealthier parts of the province. A second a
rethinking stems from the fact that the primary reason for special income tax preferences for enterprises h
disappeared. This means that more revenue will flow formally through the budgetary system and pro
governments must rethink how they will redistribute these monies among the rich and poor districts/co

Conclusions and Issues for the Future

Clearly, China is an emerging federalism. The 1994 changes were far-reaching and important, but the
one step in a movement toward a more stable intergovernmental system. It is quite likely that other major
will occur before the decade ends. But the 1994 changes were important in changing the basic direction
Center. We might conclude that it had the following effects:
1 . It was a first step toward phasing out of derivation-based sharing for the VAT, and toward the reserva
of this tax for the central government. The VAT is not an appropriate local tax.
2. The enterprise income tax is not a suitable local tax. Provincial governments will soon find ways
the tax to compete against one another, and this competition will not always be done in ways that stimu
overall economy. Moreover, as the Chinese economy continues to mature, the problem of formula allocat

profits among the provinces will become an issue.
3. The 1994 reform will likely widen the disparities between the rich and poor provinces, as the ent
income tax revenue yield recovers. This can be offset with a change in policy about subventions/grants,
altering the sharing rules about the incremental portion of VAT collections.
4. The 1994 reform has not addressed the issue of intra-province disparities.
5. Local governments still have not been given any autonomy in tax rate setting, or in setting the l
user charges. Therefore, there is no way for local governments to mobilize additional resources, except t
their income tax administration system. For the time being, this may be a major incentive.
6. The individual income tax is assigned to the local level, and this has the potential for being a prod
local tax. However, it is levied on a narrow base and the threshold is quite high.
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7. The separation of the central and local tax bureaus is a maj
is still need for the central government to gain some measure
purposes. Until the tax information system is computerized, e

Endnotes

1. For an overview see Wallich (1994) and Bird, Ebel and Wallich (1995).

2. Hofman ( 1 993) has pointed out that virtually all of the variation in per capita collections can be explai
by a squared per capita income term.

3. For more detailed discussion of these changes, see Bahl and Wallace (1995).

4. For those goods where the 17 percent VAT rate led to what was considered too great a tax reduction (e

cigarettes), a special consumption tax was imposed.
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